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The question that I wish to address is pretty simple. How do we explain that in the 
1990s when it comes to peacekeeping ope悶tions so much was done and yet so litle was 
accomplished? How do we account for this kind of paradoxワ
日目t, what do I mean by so much? I mean simply the fact that in the 199Cs, the 
number of peacekeeping operations which were deployed close to forty throughout the 
1990s, the amount of energy, money, troops deployed was the largest ever in the area of 
peacekeeping operations. Never before did the United Nations and its key member states 
had ded』cated and committed so much to peacekeeping operations. It is al the more the 
case considering that the issues that these peacekeeping operations tackled and the 
modalities that they chose to address them were a huge departure from traditional 
peacekeeping ope悶tions, which had mainly been about inte叩osition and establishing a 
truce between parties at war while lookmg for a political solution 
By comparison, the peacekeeping operations were involved in much more complex 
ISSues, 111volv10g part1t10n of countries, matters of self-determ10at1on, massive 
humanitarian crises. As for the modalities of interventions, they differed much from mere 
interpos山on. The peacekeeping ope田tions of the 1990s involved, directly or mdirectly, a 
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range of initiatives that were unthinkable before the 1990s. Humanitarian interventions, 
be it in Somalia or in the Balkans, mixture of humanitarian aid and peace enforcement, 
cooperation between the United Nations and NATO rn Bosnia and Kosovo, and the 
establishment of international criminal tribunal were ce口ainly a striking departure from 
previous peacekeeping operations practices. Yet this unmatched effort appears to be quite 
modest. And this is the other side of the corn of the paradox that I am trying to think 
about in my research project. 
Indeed, the peacekeeprng operations efforts of the 1990s, although impressive 
compared to the past, tend to be much less impressive on reflection. It is for instance the 
case when one compares the overョII budget of the peacekeeping operations for the 1990s 
with the resources main powe目 dedicate to their defence budget. The JO billions of U.S. 
dollars that peacekeeping ope回tions cost over JO yea四 a日 still minuscule compared to 
the hund問dof billions spent each year for defense, during the same period, by the United 
States and to a lesser extent by the United Kingdom, France, and other m司orpowers. 
Furthermore, the international effort of the 1990s in the field of peacekeeping 
operations appears also quite modest when it comes to the results that it produced. I do 
not say here that the United Nations and the key member states backing its efforts cnuld 
have solved al the crises of the 1990s. After al, some of them had been in the making 
for yea目 and solutions were not easily at hand However, we certainly could have done 
better than what we did in Rwanda, if not in Somalia and the Balkans. In the end, indeed, 
the results of the peacekeeping operations were rather mixed, as they did not prevent 
hundred thousands of people to be kiled, sometimes under the very eyes of peacekeepe目，
as it happened in Srebremca So how do we explain this kind of pa 回dox, the fact that so 
much was done yet very litle was accomplished in the a問a of peacekeeping operations 
in the 1990s? 
When it comes to accounting for the mixed results of the peacekeeping operations 
of the 1990s, there a同 three main explanations which are put forward in the press, in the 
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policy making circle,, in the public opinion and in academia. 
The first one is to explam the sho口comings of the peace operati旧ns of the period by 
putting the responsibility on the United Nations as an inefficient and misguided 
bu悶aucracy.
The second explanation is to refer to the lack of political will As you know, the 
expression “ lack of political will” has been used again and again to describe the limited 
commitment of the international community vis-a-vis humanitarian crises. 
The third explanation put forward is to blame the Umted States’ role, namely for its 
lack of leadership. 
